European Security Risks and Forecasts as of Late 2024 – Early 2025

The Monitoring Group of BlackSeaNews
and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies

presents the Report on European security risks and forecasts as of late 2024 – early 2025, based on the monitoring results of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, Ukraine.

* * *

By late 2023-early 2024, the West had found itself in the situation of strategic uncertainty on the prospects and duration of Russia's war against Ukraine and its consequences, which has been hindering strategic planning in Ukraine, its allied countries, and the EU as a whole.

This uncertainty leads to the emergence of ideas and proposals that do not contribute to the democratic world's victory in the fight against global totalitarianism but, on the contrary, further increase the risks. 

The problem is largely because in today's information age, politicians, experts, journalists, civil society, and business leaders are increasingly forced to draw conclusions based not on facts but rather on emotions, impressions, and misconceptions formed under the influence of insignificant but attention-grabbing or sensational information or of direct PSYOPs, which are conveniently conducted in conditions of information chaos.

Under the circumstances, no Russian statistics can be used now as a basis for analysis. At least since the beginning of the full-scale war on 24 February 2022, they have stopped reflecting the facts, becoming instead a powerful source of strategic disinformation. Therefore, it surprises us that reputable international think tanks and media continue referring to these statistics, which further supports Russian disinformation efforts, and most importantly, leads to completely erroneous conclusions and forecasts. 

We emphasize that in wartime, more than ever before, decision-making and forecasting requires analysis based on facts established by competent and trusted sources. 

To that end, it seems crucial to identify in each relevant field the processes that meet two main criteria: a) they can be adequately physically monitored and b) they make it possible to draw broader conclusions than the actual area of monitoring.

The Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies (BSISS) has been conducting such monitoring continuously since February 2014, when Russia occupied the Crimean Peninsula. The specific monitoring areas have varied depending on the current relevance and data availability.

Note that all our conclusions and forecasts are based on the results of research by the Institute’s own Monitoring Group, whose data, methodology, and professionalism we are fully certain of.

* * *

The main risk factor that determines the duration of Russia's war against Ukraine is the volume of maritime exports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products. It must be restricted in the Baltic and/or North Seas.

Depending on world prices, energy exports account for 55-70% of all Russia's export earnings. It is the exports of oil and petroleum products that are the main source of Russia's foreign currency earnings. The share of oil in Russia’s energy exports is estimated at up to 70%.

As long as that source of income exists at this level, the war against Ukraine will continue, placing a huge financial burden on EU countries. 

That risk is determined mostly by the volume of maritime exports of crude oil from Russian ports in the Baltic Sea, which accounts for about 60% of Russia's maritime oil exports, totalling 10-12 million tons of crude oil each month, which are transported by 90-100 tankers (see Appendix 1).

Therefore, sooner or later, the EU or the coalition of Baltic Sea states, including Norway and the United Kingdom, will have to apply restrictions on those maritime oil exports, as world geography does not provide us with alternatives. 

We also need to anticipate that in response to any attempts to limit its oil exports in the Baltic Sea, Russia will resort to the highest degree of hysteria, intimidation, and blackmail. However, in practice, it has no real means of countering these efforts other than physical sabotage. 

Therefore, both in advance and simultaneously with the restriction of Russian maritime oil exports, Baltic Sea and northern European states, including the UK, should strengthen their anti-sabotage measures, especially with regard to communications at the bottom of the Baltic and North Seas, wind farms, and other offshore facilities.

To be continued..

* * *

The publication has been created with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation(FES). The position of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the authors.