Articles
Andriy Klymenko: «La “flotte fantôme russe“ est un mythe inventé par commodité»
24 February 2025
Andriy Klymenko est le chef du groupe de surveillance de l’Institut d’études stratégiques de la mer Noire et le rédacteur en chef du portail BlackSeaNews. Tyzhden s’est entretenu avec lui au sujet de la flotte fantôme russe, de l’efficacité des sanctions et des perspectives de limiter le trafic pétrolier russe en mer Baltique.
Russian Baltic Sea Ports Petroleum Products Imports to the EU Embargo: Database of January 2025 Violations
22 February 2025
In January 2025, 4 violations (180.393 tons) of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian petroleum products (excluding crude oil) to the transshipment points and EU/US ports from the Baltic Sea were recorded. The voyages were made by tankers belonging to shipowners registered in the following countries: Greece, Turkey, Singapore and Croatia.
Andrii Klymenko: "The Shadow Fleet and Price Ceiling are Myths Contrived by the US for its Own Convenience"
20 February 2025
Andrii Klymenko, Head of the Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, talks about how to weaken Russia's financial capacity to wage an aggressive war; the fact that Russian oil is not really sanctioned; the shadow fleet and the possibility of shutting down the Baltic Sea to tankers with Russian “blood oil”; and the urgency of imposing a complete embargo on all trade with Russia.
Russian Crude Oil Imports to the EU Embargo Through the Russian Baltic Sea Ports: Database of January 2025 Violations
10 February 2025
In January 2025, 4 violations (484.599 tons) of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian crude oil from the Baltic Sea were recorded. The voyages were made by tankers belonging to shipowners registered in the following countries: Greece, Seychelles and Turkey.
The Problem of Assessing Russia's Economic Capacity to Wage War Under Sanctions. Part 6
21 January 2025
Extremely important political conclusions are made on the basis of the Russian official statistics and with the use of classical methods of peacetime economic and social analysis under the conditions of deliberate disinformation campaigns waged by Russia, which are intended to lead to such conclusions. Note that the BSISS conclusions had been drawn, but not yet published, a few days prior to the recent crash of the Russian Sukhoi Superjet at Antalya Airport, Turkey.
Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor as Russia's Key Military Target. Part 5
21 January 2025
The incomparably more successful operation of the Ukrainian maritime corridor to the three ports of Greater Odesa – Chornomorsk, Odesa, and Pivdennyi – than that of the Black Sea Grain Initiative under the auspices of the UN, Turkey, and the Russian Federation pushes Russia to raise the question of resuming the terminated grain deal (with Russia's participation in cargo control) during any negotiations with Turkish officials. Notably, that position is echoed by the UN Secretariat officials.
Russia is developing a new strategy to increase security risks in the Black Sea in response to the defeat of the Black Sea Fleet. Part 4
17 January 2025
The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks. This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey. Over the years of the Crimean Peninsula occupation, Russia has established a powerful land force there, including modern missile and aviation branches of its armed forces, with a developed logistics infrastructure for supplying troops, including through transport links with the Russian mainland – both via sea vessels and the so-called Crimean Bridge.
Russia's Ways of Raising the World Oil Prices. Part 3
15 January 2025
Russia has already begun taking measures to raise global oil prices, as the downward trend is utterly unacceptable for the aggressor state waging the war. While in August 2024 we did not record any tankers heading east from Russian Baltic ports around Africa, bypassing the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, in September there were already 7 such cases, and in October – 13 ones.
Russian Baltic Sea Ports Petroleum Products Imports to the EU Embargo: Database of December 2024 Violations
14 January 2025
In December 2024, 14 violations (671.541 tons) of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian petroleum products (excluding crude oil) to the transshipment points and EU/US ports from the Baltic Sea were recorded. The voyages were made by tankers belonging to shipowners registered in the following countries: Greece, Turkey, Liberia, China, Singapore, Marshall Islands, UAE, Croatia and Vietnam.
Russian Crude Oil Imports to the EU Embargo Through the Russian Baltic Sea Ports: Database of December 2024 Violations
13 January 2025
In December 2024, 4 violations (492.054 tons) of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian crude oil from the Baltic Sea were recorded. The voyages were made by tankers belonging to shipowners registered in the following countries: Greece and Turkey.
Maritime Exports of Russian Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Through its Baltic Sea Ports: December 2024 Database
10 January 2025
In December 2024, 167 violations of the export of Russian crude oil and petroleum products from the Baltic Sea were recorded. 14.5 mln tons of Russian crude oil and petroleum products were delivered through the Russian ports of the Baltic Sea.
Ways to Reduce Russia's Revenues from Seaborne Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Exports. Part 2
31 December 2024
The authors of this report represent the team that has been monitoring maritime traffic for the last 15 years. Since April 2022, we have been monitoring the traffic of tankers carrying Russian crude oil and petroleum products on a daily basis. Based on our experience, we argue that it's futile to counter "Russia's shadow fleet," as it's futile to counter anything that doesn't exist. What does exist instead is a fleet of tankers that transport Russian crude oil and petroleum products around the world.
European Security Risks and Forecasts as of Early 2025. Part 1
18 December 2024
The main risk factor that determines the duration of Russia's war against Ukraine is the volume of maritime exports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products. It must be restricted in the Baltic and/or North Seas. The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks. This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey. Russia will continue to attack Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube, trying to stop the operation of the maritime corridor and at the same time create conditions for increasing its own seaborne grain exports.
Sanctions Must Continue: A Comparative Analysis of Sanctions Against Legal Entities
15 December 2024
If the goal is to, at the very least, prevent military production by the Russian Federation, the process of identifying relevant legal entities and applying sanctions must continue at full speed. Exposing and restricting every enterprise directly or indirectly related to the Russian military-industrial complex or war financing is crucial in preventing the aggressor from producing modern weapons of the qualities and in the quantities required for warfare.
Russian Baltic Sea Ports Petroleum Products Imports to the EU Embargo: Database of November 2024 Violations
09 December 2024
In November 2024, 10 violations (448.227 tons) of the EU embargo on seaborne imports of Russian petroleum products (excluding crude oil) to the transshipment points and EU/US ports from the Baltic Sea were recorded. The voyages were made by tankers belonging to shipowners registered in the following countries: Greece, Turkey, Italy, Bangladesh, Marshall Islands and Seychelles.