Militarization of the Black Sea

The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies and BlackSeaNews, based on the results of its own monitoring of Russian missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks on the regions of Ukraine from the territory of occupied Crimea in January-September 2023, publishes an analytical report and forecasts about further use by Russia of the occupied peninsula’s territory for aggression against Ukraine and creating a threat to the countries of the region in 2023. We hope that our experts’ opinions, conclusions, and forecasts will clearly demonstrate to politicians, diplomats, analysts, and journalists in countries supporting Ukraine's struggle against the Russian invasion that without the liberation of Crimea, it is impossible to talk about victory in this war.

Over the first 9 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – totaling 26 missiles monthly – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, whose main base is in the occupied Crimean Peninsula, 590 – 65 monthly —Shahed-136/131 UAVs, 40 Iskander ballistic missiles and 17 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-September 2023.

For centuries, Russia has sought to warp the Black Sea balance of power for its own gain. Since Russia’s February 2022 invasion, destabilizing allied Black Sea military and commercial operations while maintaining Russian commercial shipping became a natural priority.

Initially, a direct voyage from a Russian port to a Ukrainian one during the war struck us as a coincidence that, however, prompted us to start checking for similar voyages by other vessels. As a result, we've easily identified a fairly significant number of vessels that arrived at Ukrainian ports having previously called at the Russian ports. For security reasons, including counteracting possible sabotage, special decisions should be made to prevent maritime businesses from chartering vessels that operate to Russian ports for the transportation of goods to/from Ukrainian ports or simply ban such vessels from entering Ukrainian ports.

In the 2022 Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders, Ukraine ranked 106th out of 180, losing 9 positions over the course of the year, but still remaining way ahead of Azerbaijan. The main reason for the drop in the ranking has certainly been Russia's full-scale military aggression, that has had a detrimental effect on all fields of life, including the information space.

Before discussing the topic of the Ukraine’s image in the information space of the Republic of Azerbaijan, it is worth first to consider the general condition of the Azerbaijan’s mass media in comparison with that in Ukraine. This is particularly important in order to assess the radical changes that took place in both countries after the outbreak of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war.

Based on the results of our own monitoring (see Table 1), the Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies and the BlackSeaNews editorial board presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-May 2023. Over the first 5 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 93 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – totaling 19 missiles monthly – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, whose main base is in the occupied Crimean Peninsula, 37 – 7 monthly —Shahed-136/131 UAVs, 21 Iskander ballistic missiles and 3 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles.

Just before the large-scale attack on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Russia had formed in the Mediterranean Sea an unprecedented grouping of warships from all four of its fleets. Specifically, in the first decade of February 2022, Russia's «Mediterranean squadron» included 29 ships and boats, specifically: 11 missile ships, 6 large amphibious assault ships (LST), a patrol corvette, 2 minesweepers, an anti-submarine warfare boat, 2 reconnaissance ships, 4 auxiliary supply vessels, and 2 tugs. In the late summer of 2022, Russia began a gradual withdrawal of its main warships from the region. So, by May 2023, the number of missile ships in the Russian «Mediterranean squadron» had decreased to 3 — the smallest number since February 2022.

No ships arrived at Ukrainian ports through the grain corridor from 9 to 20 May 2023. There have been no interruptions for such a long time since the beginning of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This happened soon after 13 April 2023, when Russia for the first time formally compiled a detailed list of demands for the lifting of sanctions in return for its further participation in the Grain Initiative. The demands were presented in the form of an ultimatum to the UN Secretariat, although the UN cannot resolve the issue of easing sanctions.

According to the position paper of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, “Strategic partnership is a type of interstate relations, built as a consistent system of interaction between states towards fulfilling common strategic tasks and pursuing common strategic interests and goals. Unlike alliance relations, strategic partnership does not involve a rigid system of political, economic, humanitarian, or security obligations.”

According to the position paper of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, “Strategic partnership is a type of interstate relations, built as a consistent system of interaction between states towards fulfilling common strategic tasks and pursuing common strategic interests and goals. Unlike alliance relations, strategic partnership does not involve a rigid system of political, economic, humanitarian, or security obligations.”

The average daily number of ships arriving at the ports of Odesa as part of the «Black Sea Grain Initiative» is one of the indicators of military risks for the region. While in September 2022, it averaged 5.9 vessels per day, in October – 5.1, in November 2022 – 3.3, in December – 3.2, in January 2023 – 2.8, in February – 2.5 and between March 1-10, 2023 – 2.8 vessels per day. The decrease is the result of Russia conscious policy of inspecting no more than 3-4 vessels per day as part of its joint inspections with Turkey. The RF agreement to extend the «grain initiative» for 60, instead of the previous 120 days, is predetermined by the single factor — the May 14, 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey.

Such modern naval warfare does not render International Law irrelevant. On the contrary, the distinction between applicable legal regimes and possible classifications become even more crucial for the sake of clarity and predictability of law and warfare. Here it is necessary to differentiate between 2 distinct regimes applicable to naval drones used either in times of peace or during an ongoing armed conflict. The latter is clearly the case of Sevastopol and Novorossiysk drone attacks conducted in the framework of military hostilities between Russia and Ukraine “plainly engaged in an international armed conflict’.

The average number of vessels arriving per day at the ports of Odesa as part of the Black Sea Grain Initiative is one of the indicators of military risks. In September 2022, it was 5.9 vessels per day; in October – 5.1; in November – 3.3; and in December – 3.2. That is, in November, as a result of Russia’s deliberate actions, the number of vessels receiving permits for voyages to Ukrainian ports almost halved. Blocking the "grain corridor" remains an integral part of Putin's plan for a new stage of the war. That is, in the event of a new Russian offensive, the "grain corridor" may be blocked.

As we have predicted earlier, Russia continues the reduction and rotation of its naval group in the Mediterranean. On 16 October 2022, 2 missile corvettes of the Russian Baltic Fleet - (531) Soobrazitelnyi and (545) Stoikiy - entered the Mediterranean Sea through the Strait of Gibraltar. On 21 October 2022, the missile cruiser (011) Varyag, the flagship of the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Federation (PF), the large anti-submarine ship (564) Admiral Tributs (PF), and the oil tanker/supply ship Boris Butoma left the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal.