Crimea Under Occupation

The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies and BlackSeaNews, based on the results of its own monitoring, presents a database of attacks by Ukrainian drones and missiles on the territory of occupied Crimea and Russian ships in the Black Sea in January-December 2023. From January to December 2023, i.e., over 365 days, the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out at least 184 attacks on targets in Crimean peninsula and Russian Black Sea Fleet, averaging one every other day.

Over the 11 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (no launches registered since September 25, 2023); at least 750 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launches, not including those launched from the Russian regions; 62 Iskander ballistic missiles and 25 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-November 2023.

The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies and BlackSeaNews, based on the results of its own monitoring, presents a database of attacks by Ukrainian drones and missiles on the territory of occupied Crimea and Russian ships in the Black Sea in January-November 2023. From January to November 2023, i.e., over 334 days, the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out at least 168 attacks on targets in Crimean peninsula and Russian Black Sea Fleet, averaging one every other day.

From January to October 2023, i.e., over 304 days, the Ukrainian Defense Forces carried out at least 155 attacks on targets in Crimean peninsula and Russian Black Sea Fleet, averaging one every other day. Among those: in Sevastopol – at least 37 attacks, or 24%; on BSF ships at sea – at least 19 attacks, or 12%; in Yevpatoriya, Saksky, Chornomorsky and Rozdolnensky districts (Western Crimea) – at least 25 attacks, or 16%; in Dzhankoy region— at least 14 attacks, or 9%; in Feodosia region – at least 12 attacks, or 7.6%; on Kerch Bridge – at least 4 attacks.

Rule 41 of customary international humanitarian law states that the Occupying Power must prevent the illicit export of cultural property from occupied territory and must return illicitly exported property to the competent authorities of the occupied territory. However, the Russian Federation deliberately violates the provisions of international law and implements a state policy in the occupied territories of Ukraine aimed at destroying Ukraine's cultural heritage. Russia has organized the illegal large-scale export of cultural property from Ukraine. The organization of the illegal trafficking of cultural property from Ukraine is an element of Russian state policy.

The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies and BlackSeaNews, based on the results of its own monitoring of Russian missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks on the regions of Ukraine from the territory of occupied Crimea in January-September 2023, publishes an analytical report and forecasts about further use by Russia of the occupied peninsula’s territory for aggression against Ukraine and creating a threat to the countries of the region in 2023. We hope that our experts’ opinions, conclusions, and forecasts will clearly demonstrate to politicians, diplomats, analysts, and journalists in countries supporting Ukraine's struggle against the Russian invasion that without the liberation of Crimea, it is impossible to talk about victory in this war.

Over the first 9 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – totaling 26 missiles monthly – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, whose main base is in the occupied Crimean Peninsula, 590 – 65 monthly —Shahed-136/131 UAVs, 40 Iskander ballistic missiles and 17 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-September 2023.

The gigantic 3-fold surge retail trade turnover in Crimea and Sevastopol in early 2023 was due solely to the presence of a huge number of Russian servicemen, i.e. men with a healthy appetite. The vast majority of "new Crimean tourists" in 2022-23 are wearing Russian army camouflage. There is also a "new medical tourism" -- that is, treatment and rehabilitation of thousands of wounded soldiers who now use previously civilian hospitals, as well as a "human shield" made of the children vising Artek.

One doesn't need to be a tourism professional to comprehend the fundamental incompatibility of tourism and military operations. So, to understand the realities of Crimea’s 2023 tourist season, it’s enough to read the list of unmanned air and sea drone attacks on Crimean military targets between June 1-July 30, 2023 and look at the tourist instructions on passing the Kerch Bridge inspections, with 10 of them directly impacting automobile and rail transportation.

The Crimean Titan may become part of a large titanium holding company being created in Russia by the companies closely affiliated with the Rotenberg brothers or a «fallen hero» holding back the Ukrainian offensive. Either one of the diametrically opposed scenarios is a real possibility in the near future. In any case, in recent months, Crimean patriots have been regularly reporting that Russia has been taking steps to turn the Crimean Titan into a fortification on the path of a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Since May this year, Ukrainian officials have been also voicing such opinion.

Since February 24, 2022, the Crimean peninsula has acquired a new pivotal function — that of a Russian military foothold. In early 2022, Crimea developed the following new role and specifics of the frontline region. Since mid-2022, the war has come directly to Crimea. The events of the second half of 2022 have effectively transformed the Crimean peninsula from being a frontline region of the winning army to a frontline region of a limited combat operations of the losing army. By 2023, all that created in and around the occupied peninsula a fundamentally new atmosphere of expectation of an upcoming Ukrainian offensive on Crimea, which now affects all areas of life there.

Based on the results of our own monitoring (see Table 1), the Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies and the BlackSeaNews editorial board presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-May 2023. Over the first 5 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 93 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – totaling 19 missiles monthly – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, whose main base is in the occupied Crimean Peninsula, 37 – 7 monthly —Shahed-136/131 UAVs, 21 Iskander ballistic missiles and 3 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles.

Russia’s failures in the all-out war against Ukraine and the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have turned the Crimean Peninsula not only into a region near the frontline but also into an area of limited hostilities. This has created a fundamentally new reality in occupied Crimea — the anticipation of the Ukrainian offensive on the occupied peninsula, which affects all spheres of life there. These factors have put an end to the prospects of the Crimean economy sectors that under the occupation had been considered the primary ones — first of all, the defence industry.

In 2013, foreign exports from the Crimean Peninsula amounted to 904.9 million dollars, and foreign imports totalled 1.044 billion dollars; Sevastopol’s exports and imports were valued at 99.8 million dollars and 106.9 million dollars, respectively. Thus, in 2020, exports from Crimea decreased by 26.7 times in dollar terms compared to 2013, the last pre-war year, and exports from Sevastopol dropped by 21,2 times. The decline in imports over the same period was by 25.4 times in Crimea and by 21.4 times in Sevastopol.

Russia's decision to finally renovate the water supply networks on the occupied peninsula was also a consequence of the fact that in early 2021, Ukraine, for the first time at the level of state documents, recorded its position on restoring water supply to Crimea through the North Crimean Canal. At the same time, the risks of a possible military special operation of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Kherson region, where the North Crimean Canal begins, remain.