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The first element of Russia's new maritime tactics/strategy in the Black Sea
15 October 2024
Our ongoing daily monitoring and analysis of the Ukrainian sea corridor operation leads us to believe that the ballistic missile attacks on the ports of Greater Odesa that damage the ships are NOT episodes, but rather a new strategy aimed at incapacitating the Ukrainian sea corridor.
On the Necessity to Adopt a Law of Ukraine on the Territorial Sea of Ukraine in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and the North-Eastern Part of the Black Sea
19 August 2024
The Ukrainian parliament condemned the state policy of the Russian Federation on the growing militarization of the Black and Azov Seas and the Kerch Strait, and systematic cases of hampering or blocking of international navigation by the Russian Federation, which undermines security and stability in the region and beyond.
Hybrid War and Hybrid Peace on the Black Sea. The Parallel Realities
14 August 2024
Both the Ukrainian and foreign readers are, of course, well aware of one of the biggest surprises of this war — namely, the defeat of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), that as a result, has been forced to largely abandon its historic main base in the occupied Sevastopol. That case is now, certainly, being closely studied by all the general staffs and military academies of the world.
Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-February 2024
18 March 2024
In January-February 2024, for attacks from Crimea on the Ukrainian regions the Russian Armed Forces used at least: 6 units of Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, 3 of which — in February; 11 Iskander-type ballistic missiles, 2 of which — in February; P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles were not used in January-February 2024; 392 Shahed-136/131 strike UAVs launched from Crimea and from the regions of the Russian Federation together, 169 of which — in February; 82 Shahed-136/131 UAVs Shahed-136/131 strike UAVs launched from Crimea, without simultaneous attacks from the RF.
Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January 2024
28 February 2024
In January 2024, the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) continued to strike all of Ukraine, using the temporarily occupied territory (TOT) of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) and the adjacent Black Sea as launchpads for strike and reconnaissance drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles. As predicted, Russia has increased the share of Shahed-136/131 attack drones in its strike arsenal, primarily due to the start of its mass production within the country
Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-December 2023
21 January 2024
Over the 12 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (no launches registered since September 25, 2023); at least 1250 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launches, not including those launched from the Russian regions; 62 Iskander ballistic missiles and 25 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-December 2023.
Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-November 2023
26 December 2023
Over the 11 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (no launches registered since September 25, 2023); at least 750 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launches, not including those launched from the Russian regions; 62 Iskander ballistic missiles and 25 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-November 2023.
The operations of the Ukrainian temporary maritime export corridor from the ports of Greater Odesa (the database as of 16/10/2023)
17 October 2023
The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, based on its own monitoring, publishes a database of vessels that arrived in and departed from the ports of Greater Odesa along the new Ukrainian temporary maritime export corridor, which began operating on 16 September 2023. As of 16 October 2023, the number of ships that arrived along this corridor in the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdenny to take on cargo is 31. Their total deadweight is 1.3 million tons. 17 vessels out of 31 have already left the ports with cargo and are on their way to or have already arrived in their ports of destination.
The fate of the ships that were in the ports of Ukraine on 24 February 2022: The updated database
27 September 2023
As of 26 September 2023, of the 100 vessels that were blocked in Ukrainian ports on 24 February 2022, 50 remain: 29 of them are in the ports of the Mykolaiv region, 14 – in Kherson, and 5 – in Mariupol. For various reasons, 2 sea vessels out of 41 that were blocked on 24 February 2022 remain in the ports of the Odesa region. Of these 50 vessels, 15 belong to shipowner companies from EU countries (8 – to Greek shipowners, 3 – to Maltese ones, 1 vessel – to shipowners from Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, and Denmark each), 14 – to shipowners from Turkey, and 8 – to Ukrainian shipowner companies. Other shipowners include companies from Norway, China, Great Britain, Montenegro, Bangladesh, the Marshall Islands, Lebanon, Egypt, and Singapore.
The grain corridor in the Black Sea in June – July 2023: The final statistics and database
02 August 2023
Long periods, starting from 9 May 2023, when no ships arrived at the ports, were explained not by weather conditions, but solely by the blocking of inspections by Russian JCC inspectors under various pretexts.
Foreign Merchant Ships Calling at Russian Ports Before Proceeding to the Ukrainian Ones
01 July 2023
Initially, a direct voyage from a Russian port to a Ukrainian one during the war struck us as a coincidence that, however, prompted us to start checking for similar voyages by other vessels. As a result, we've easily identified a fairly significant number of vessels that arrived at Ukrainian ports having previously called at the Russian ports. For security reasons, including counteracting possible sabotage, special decisions should be made to prevent maritime businesses from chartering vessels that operate to Russian ports for the transportation of goods to/from Ukrainian ports or simply ban such vessels from entering Ukrainian ports.
The grain corridor in the Black Sea in April-May 2023: Russia’s ultimatum demanding the lifting of sanctions
31 May 2023
No ships arrived at Ukrainian ports through the grain corridor from 9 to 20 May 2023. There have been no interruptions for such a long time since the beginning of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. This happened soon after 13 April 2023, when Russia for the first time formally compiled a detailed list of demands for the lifting of sanctions in return for its further participation in the Grain Initiative. The demands were presented in the form of an ultimatum to the UN Secretariat, although the UN cannot resolve the issue of easing sanctions.
The Black Sea «Grain Corridor» between September 2022 - March 2023 — New Highlights
17 March 2023
The average daily number of ships arriving at the ports of Odesa as part of the «Black Sea Grain Initiative» is one of the indicators of military risks for the region. While in September 2022, it averaged 5.9 vessels per day, in October – 5.1, in November 2022 – 3.3, in December – 3.2, in January 2023 – 2.8, in February – 2.5 and between March 1-10, 2023 – 2.8 vessels per day. The decrease is the result of Russia conscious policy of inspecting no more than 3-4 vessels per day as part of its joint inspections with Turkey. The RF agreement to extend the «grain initiative» for 60, instead of the previous 120 days, is predetermined by the single factor — the May 14, 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey.
The "grain corridor" in the Black Sea in September-December 2022. Important statistics
22 January 2023
The average number of vessels arriving per day at the ports of Odesa as part of the Black Sea Grain Initiative is one of the indicators of military risks. In September 2022, it was 5.9 vessels per day; in October – 5.1; in November – 3.3; and in December – 3.2. That is, in November, as a result of Russia’s deliberate actions, the number of vessels receiving permits for voyages to Ukrainian ports almost halved. Blocking the "grain corridor" remains an integral part of Putin's plan for a new stage of the war. That is, in the event of a new Russian offensive, the "grain corridor" may be blocked.
The presence of Russian warships in the Mediterranean Sea as of 6 November 2022
06 November 2022
As we have predicted earlier, Russia continues the reduction and rotation of its naval group in the Mediterranean. On 16 October 2022, 2 missile corvettes of the Russian Baltic Fleet - (531) Soobrazitelnyi and (545) Stoikiy - entered the Mediterranean Sea through the Strait of Gibraltar. On 21 October 2022, the missile cruiser (011) Varyag, the flagship of the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Federation (PF), the large anti-submarine ship (564) Admiral Tributs (PF), and the oil tanker/supply ship Boris Butoma left the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal.