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Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor as Russia's Key Military Target. Part 5
21 January 2025
The incomparably more successful operation of the Ukrainian maritime corridor to the three ports of Greater Odesa – Chornomorsk, Odesa, and Pivdennyi – than that of the Black Sea Grain Initiative under the auspices of the UN, Turkey, and the Russian Federation pushes Russia to raise the question of resuming the terminated grain deal (with Russia's participation in cargo control) during any negotiations with Turkish officials. Notably, that position is echoed by the UN Secretariat officials.
Russia is developing a new strategy to increase security risks in the Black Sea in response to the defeat of the Black Sea Fleet. Part 4
17 January 2025
The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks. This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey. Over the years of the Crimean Peninsula occupation, Russia has established a powerful land force there, including modern missile and aviation branches of its armed forces, with a developed logistics infrastructure for supplying troops, including through transport links with the Russian mainland – both via sea vessels and the so-called Crimean Bridge.
Russia's Ways of Raising the World Oil Prices. Part 3
15 January 2025
Russia has already begun taking measures to raise global oil prices, as the downward trend is utterly unacceptable for the aggressor state waging the war. While in August 2024 we did not record any tankers heading east from Russian Baltic ports around Africa, bypassing the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, in September there were already 7 such cases, and in October – 13 ones.
Ways to Reduce Russia's Revenues from Seaborne Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Exports. Part 2
31 December 2024
The authors of this report represent the team that has been monitoring maritime traffic for the last 15 years. Since April 2022, we have been monitoring the traffic of tankers carrying Russian crude oil and petroleum products on a daily basis. Based on our experience, we argue that it's futile to counter "Russia's shadow fleet," as it's futile to counter anything that doesn't exist. What does exist instead is a fleet of tankers that transport Russian crude oil and petroleum products around the world.
European Security Risks and Forecasts as of Early 2025. Part 1
18 December 2024
The main risk factor that determines the duration of Russia's war against Ukraine is the volume of maritime exports of Russian crude oil and petroleum products. It must be restricted in the Baltic and/or North Seas. The situation in the Black Sea in the coming year will remain volatile with a tendency towards increased military risks. This will amplify the risks to the EU countries in the Black Sea – Romania and Bulgaria – as well as to Moldova and Turkey. Russia will continue to attack Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea and the Danube, trying to stop the operation of the maritime corridor and at the same time create conditions for increasing its own seaborne grain exports.
The first element of Russia's new maritime tactics/strategy in the Black Sea
15 October 2024
Our ongoing daily monitoring and analysis of the Ukrainian sea corridor operation leads us to believe that the ballistic missile attacks on the ports of Greater Odesa that damage the ships are NOT episodes, but rather a new strategy aimed at incapacitating the Ukrainian sea corridor.
On the Necessity to Adopt a Law of Ukraine on the Territorial Sea of Ukraine in the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait and the North-Eastern Part of the Black Sea
19 August 2024
The Ukrainian parliament condemned the state policy of the Russian Federation on the growing militarization of the Black and Azov Seas and the Kerch Strait, and systematic cases of hampering or blocking of international navigation by the Russian Federation, which undermines security and stability in the region and beyond.
Hybrid War and Hybrid Peace on the Black Sea. The Parallel Realities
14 August 2024
Both the Ukrainian and foreign readers are, of course, well aware of one of the biggest surprises of this war — namely, the defeat of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF), that as a result, has been forced to largely abandon its historic main base in the occupied Sevastopol. That case is now, certainly, being closely studied by all the general staffs and military academies of the world.
Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-February 2024
18 March 2024
In January-February 2024, for attacks from Crimea on the Ukrainian regions the Russian Armed Forces used at least: 6 units of Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, 3 of which — in February; 11 Iskander-type ballistic missiles, 2 of which — in February; P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles were not used in January-February 2024; 392 Shahed-136/131 strike UAVs launched from Crimea and from the regions of the Russian Federation together, 169 of which — in February; 82 Shahed-136/131 UAVs Shahed-136/131 strike UAVs launched from Crimea, without simultaneous attacks from the RF.
Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January 2024
28 February 2024
In January 2024, the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) continued to strike all of Ukraine, using the temporarily occupied territory (TOT) of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (ARC) and the adjacent Black Sea as launchpads for strike and reconnaissance drones, and cruise and ballistic missiles. As predicted, Russia has increased the share of Shahed-136/131 attack drones in its strike arsenal, primarily due to the start of its mass production within the country
Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-December 2023
21 January 2024
Over the 12 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (no launches registered since September 25, 2023); at least 1250 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launches, not including those launched from the Russian regions; 62 Iskander ballistic missiles and 25 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-December 2023.
Database of Russian Missile and UAV Attacks on Ukrainian Regions from the Occupied Crimea in January-November 2023
26 December 2023
Over the 11 months of 2023, the Russian Armed Forces used the occupied Crimea to strike at the regions of Ukraine, including with: 230 Kalibr sea-launched cruise missiles – from ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (no launches registered since September 25, 2023); at least 750 Shahed-136/131 UAVs launches, not including those launched from the Russian regions; 62 Iskander ballistic missiles and 25 P-800 Oniks anti-ship missiles. The Monitoring Group of the BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute for Strategic Studies Based on the results of our own monitoring presents the database Russian Missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Attacks on the Regions of Ukraine from the Occupied Crimea in January-November 2023.
The operations of the Ukrainian temporary maritime export corridor from the ports of Greater Odesa (the database as of 16/10/2023)
17 October 2023
The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies, based on its own monitoring, publishes a database of vessels that arrived in and departed from the ports of Greater Odesa along the new Ukrainian temporary maritime export corridor, which began operating on 16 September 2023. As of 16 October 2023, the number of ships that arrived along this corridor in the ports of Odesa, Chornomorsk, and Pivdenny to take on cargo is 31. Their total deadweight is 1.3 million tons. 17 vessels out of 31 have already left the ports with cargo and are on their way to or have already arrived in their ports of destination.
The fate of the ships that were in the ports of Ukraine on 24 February 2022: The updated database
27 September 2023
As of 26 September 2023, of the 100 vessels that were blocked in Ukrainian ports on 24 February 2022, 50 remain: 29 of them are in the ports of the Mykolaiv region, 14 – in Kherson, and 5 – in Mariupol. For various reasons, 2 sea vessels out of 41 that were blocked on 24 February 2022 remain in the ports of the Odesa region. Of these 50 vessels, 15 belong to shipowner companies from EU countries (8 – to Greek shipowners, 3 – to Maltese ones, 1 vessel – to shipowners from Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, and Denmark each), 14 – to shipowners from Turkey, and 8 – to Ukrainian shipowner companies. Other shipowners include companies from Norway, China, Great Britain, Montenegro, Bangladesh, the Marshall Islands, Lebanon, Egypt, and Singapore.
The grain corridor in the Black Sea in June – July 2023: The final statistics and database
02 August 2023
Long periods, starting from 9 May 2023, when no ships arrived at the ports, were explained not by weather conditions, but solely by the blocking of inspections by Russian JCC inspectors under various pretexts.