Freedom of Navigation Monitoring

In January 2022, the number of Russian warships in the Mediterranean Sea changed dramatically. 6 major landing ships from the Baltic and Northern Fleets joined the "Mediterranean Squadron" of the Russian Federation. A missile cruiser and a missile frigate from the Pacific Fleet are expected to arrive via the Suez Canal. Thus, in February 2022, the Russian naval group in the Mediterranean Sea will have 18 major warships, including 8 missile ships (in December 2021, these figures were 8 and 5 respectively)

From December 2018 to December 2020, due to the threat of the "Azov package" of international sanctions against Russian ports on the Sea of Azov, there was a slight decrease in the average duration of artificial delays of ships at the exit from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea: in 2018 − 79.5 hours; in 2019 − up to 37.4 hours; in 2020 − 29.6 hours per vessel. In 2021, this figure has increased significantly to 39.8 hours per vessel and already exceeded those for 2019 and 2020.

Russia is continuing to prepare for war. Increased obstruction of traffic in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov has been recorded. The possibility of military action on the Ukrainian coast of the Sea of Azov, in particular airborne assault and amphibious operations, cannot be ruled out. The risk of Russian aggression will increase during the winter holidays and the Winter Olympics in China. The almost continuous presence in the Black Sea of powerful NATO missile ships is an effective deterrent to the aggressor.

The Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies and BlackSeaNews reports about closure of the various areas of the Black Sea and Azov Sea in November-December, 2021.

From December 2018 to December 2020, due to the threat of the "Azov package" of international sanctions against Russian ports on the Sea of Azov, there was a slight decrease in the average duration of artificial delays of ships at the exit from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea: in 2018 − 79.5 hours; in 2019 − up to 37.4 hours; in 2020 − 29.6 hours per vessel. However, over the first 11 months of 2021, this figure has increased significantly to 39.4 hours per vessel and already exceeded those for 2019 and 2020...

From December 2018 to December 2020, due to the threat of the "Azov package" of international sanctions against Russian ports on the Sea of Azov, there was a slight decrease in the average duration of arbitrary delays of ships before leaving the Sea of Azov for the Black Sea:  in 2018 − 79.5 hours; in 2019 − up to 37.4 hours; in 2020 − 29.6 hours per vessel.  However, for 9 months of 2021, this figure has increased significantly  to 39.7 hours per vessel.

The Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, BlackSeaNews and Maidan of Foreign Affairs reports about closure of the various areas of the Black Sea in October, 2021.

In September 2021, the average duration of artificial delays of vessels going from the Black Sea to the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, Mariupol and Berdiansk, by the RF was 22,4 hours. In September 2021, vessels carrying exports from Mariupol and Berdiansk were delayed at the exit from the Sea of Azov by the Russian Federation for an average of 39,7 hours

The Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, BlackSeaNews and Maidan of Foreign Affairs reports about closure of the various areas of the Black Sea in September, 2021.

In July 2021, the average duration of artificial delays of vessels going from the Black Sea to the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, Mariupol and Berdiansk, by the RF was 31,2 hours., in August 2021 – 15,3 hours. In July 2021, vessels carrying exports from Mariupol and Berdiansk were delayed at the exit from the Sea of Azov by the Russian Federation for an average of 28,0 hours, in February 2021 – 30,7 hours.

The Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, BlackSeaNews and Maidan of Foreign Affairs reports about closure of the various areas of the Black Sea in August, 2021.

What has become increasingly important since 2018 is not only the developments on the occupied peninsula itself but also how Russia has been using Crimea, which has turned from a global problem into a military threat. It should be emphasized that no one can reliably predict what scenarios Russia will enact using the military capabilities created on the occupied peninsula. It is only possible to assert that the Russian Federation has not stopped and will not stop. We can also be certain that both blackmail by war and the actual "hot" war in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov against the coastal regions of Ukraine, as well as Georgia and Moldova, based on Crimea's military power, are completely realistic scenarios, which diplomats and the military should have on the table.

The article provides a selective legal analysis of some international agreements and existing formats of cooperation that have been used, are being used or may be used in the future by the Russian Federation (RF) in order to harm the national interest of Ukraine at sea.

The Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, BlackSeaNews and Maidan of Foreign Affairs reports about closure of the various areas of the Black Sea in July, 2021.

In June 2021, the average duration of artificial delays of vessels going from the Black Sea to the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, Mariupol and Berdiansk, by the RF was 13.5 hours, vessels carrying exports from Mariupol and Berdiansk were delayed at the exit from the Sea of Azov by the Russian Federation for an average of 21.7 hours.