Articles
Russia’s crude oil exports from the Black Sea in April-October 2022 (2)
08 November 2022
Following the EU decision to introduce sanctions on the maritime export of Russian crude oil starting December 5, 2022 — Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879 of June 3, 2022 — we’ve observed the following trends: retention of the total volume of Russian crude oil Black Sea exports at 3.5 million tons; certain decrease in exports to EU countries; generally unsuccessful attempts of Russia to replace exports to the EU with those to other countries. The much talked about in the media reorientation of the crude oil exports to India and China, in fact, hasn’t materialized. A month before the introduction of sanctions, Russia has been able to compensate for only up to 4% of its crude oil exports to EU countries.
The April-October 2022 Exports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products from Russian’s Black and Azov Seas Ports: General Trends and Database (1)
08 November 2022
After a significant May 2022 surge of 13.9 million tons per month, the total volume of Russian sea exports of crude oil and petroleum products from the Black and Azov sea ports, has been showing a steady downward trend to 10.7 million tons in October 2022. In view of the situation, Russia has been making consistent attempts to reorient its crude oil export flows from the EU+ states to other countries of the world. However, considering those a success would be premature. The introduction of the European embargo on the import of oil on oil mixtures may lead to Russian Black Sea crude oil exports crashing by half.
A Review of the Impact of International Sanctions on the Socio-economic Situation in the Russian Federation
07 November 2022
Putin's October 2022 statements have sent a clear signal: Russia wants to supply fuel to Europe. The start of the EU embargo on Russian maritime oil and petroleum products export on December 5, 2022, and February 5, 2023, respectively, could become a major turning point. The war, sanctions and trade blockade put the Russian economy on the «powder keg» of future trillion-dollar defaults. Russian economy is currently experiencing a growing jam of loan defaults. No sector of the Russian economy would remain unaffected by the current crisis caused by the large-scale war and Western sanctions. The sanctions hit Russia much more painfully than those who apply them.
The presence of Russian warships in the Mediterranean Sea as of 6 November 2022
06 November 2022
As we have predicted earlier, Russia continues the reduction and rotation of its naval group in the Mediterranean. On 16 October 2022, 2 missile corvettes of the Russian Baltic Fleet - (531) Soobrazitelnyi and (545) Stoikiy - entered the Mediterranean Sea through the Strait of Gibraltar. On 21 October 2022, the missile cruiser (011) Varyag, the flagship of the Pacific Fleet of the Russian Federation (PF), the large anti-submarine ship (564) Admiral Tributs (PF), and the oil tanker/supply ship Boris Butoma left the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal.
Production of military products at the captured plants of occupied Crimea in 2014-2022
03 November 2022
Russia’s failures in the all-out war against Ukraine and the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have turned the Crimean Peninsula not only into a region near the frontline but also into an area of limited hostilities. This has created a fundamentally new reality in occupied Crimea — the anticipation of the Ukrainian offensive on the occupied peninsula, which affects all spheres of life there. These factors have put an end to the prospects of the Crimean economy sectors that under the occupation had been considered the primary ones — first of all, the defence industry.
The “grain corridor”: Russia has artificially increased the waiting time for the inspection of ships carrying Ukrainian grain in the Sea of Marmara
01 November 2022
Since 18 September 2022, the waiting time for the “grain fleet” vessels to be inspected by the Joint Coordination Centre (JCC) in the Sea of Marmara has increased by 5 times and reached 11.3 days per vessel. Such a situation is totally disadvantageous for 3 out of 4 participants of the "grain initiative" - the UN, Turkey, and Ukraine. Our main assumption is that Russia is once again using this situation in connection with other issues - for example, the ceasefire on the front line, which is located at a distance of 40-60 km from the grain corridor area.
«Russian Сivilization» vs «Western Racism». Why Russia is Updating and Globalizing its Propaganda
21 October 2022
In recent weeks, the rhetoric of Russian top politicians has become notably peppered with the expressions «Russian civilization» and «Western racism». While the process has been obviously accelerated by the autumn defeats of the Russian Army in Ukraine, the expressions themselves have obtained new colors and interpretations. According to our monitoring, the term «Russian civilization» is being personally pushed by top officials in the Kremlin and Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Russian rhetoric, the term «Russian civilization» is promoted simultaneously with «racism» when referring to the actions of the West against Russia in general and Russians in particular.
September 2022 Database of Russian Oil and Diesel Fuel Carriers From the Black and Azov Seas
17 October 2022
The EU has ruled to introduce an embargo on Russian oil imported by sea starting December 5, 2022, and oil products – starting February 5, 2023. Meanwhile, in September 2022, 183 tankers of shipowners from 23 countries transported Russian and Caspian Kazakh-Russian crude oil and petroleum products from the Black and Azov Sea ports. Of those, 95 (52%) belong to shipowners from the EU and other western states. After the embargo kicks in, shipowners from those countries should be ready to find a new job for their 95 tankers. This mainly applies to Greek shipowners, whose share in that tanker fleet is 80% (76 tankers).
The Presence of Russian Warships in the Mediterranean Sea as of 10 October 2022
12 October 2022
As of October 10, 2022, the confirmed composition of the Russian Navy ship group in the Mediterranean Sea includes 8 warships — 6 of which missile — and 3 auxiliary vessels. On September 19, 2022, the Baltic Fleet reconnaissance ship Vasiliy Tatishchev left the Mediterranean Sea via Gibraltar and on September 24, 2022, — the Black Sea Fleet missile submarine Novorossiysk accompanied by the Sergey Balk tug. We maintain that the Russian Navy will continue this Mediterranean Sea rotation in the near future.
Russia's use of the territory of occupied Crimea for aggression against Ukraine and creating a threat to the countries of the region
05 October 2022
Russia's use of the territory of occupied Crimea for aggression against Ukraine and creating a threat to the countries of the region
As of September 26, 2022, 60 of 100 vessels remain blocked in the ports of Ukraine/ Database
28 September 2022
As of February 24, 2022, 100 commercial vessels docked in the Ukrainian ports, not counting those of the occupied Crimea, all of which remained under the naval blockade by the Russian Federation. Of these 100, 34 belong to ship-owning companies from the EU countries, namely, 21— Greece and 24 — Turkey. As of September 26, 60 of the 100 vessels remain blocked: 29 – in the Mykolaiv region ports, 14 – in Kherson and 5 – in Mariupol. For various reasons, 12 of the 41 that were blocked on February 24, currently remain in the ports of the Odesa region.
Сrude Oil Export from Russian Black and Azov Sea Ports in April-August 2022
19 September 2022
If in July 2022 the RF crude oil was imported from the Black and Azov seas to 7 EU countries, in August that number dropped to 4. Only Greece, the traditional leader of our ranking, almost doubled its imports that month raising its share in the Russian Black Sea-Azov crude oil EU imports from 34 to 61%. There have been no signs of any exports reorientation to India and China. Moreover, in August, for the first time since the beginning of the large-scale war, India actually reduced imports by 30.27%, or 266,875 tons, while China did not import a single ton of Russia’s Black Sea oil.
The Presence of Russian Warships in the Mediterranean Sea as of 15 September 2022
16 September 2022
In late summer of 2022, Russia began the rotation of part of its warships in the Mediterranean Sea. missile ships of the Northern Fleet, a reconnaissance ship of the Black Sea Fleet, 2 oil tankers of the Black Sea and Northern Fleets were withdrawn from the Mediterranean Sea. As of 15 September 2022, the confirmed composition of the Russian Navy squadron in the Mediterranean Sea includes 10 ships (7 of which are missile ships) and 4 auxiliary vessels. If another missile submarine is officially confirmed to be in the Mediterranean, the total number of ships will change from 10 to 11, and the number of missile ships will rise from 7 to 8.
Exports of petroleum products (except crude oil) from Russia’s ports on the Black and Azov Seas in April-July 2022
16 August 2022
Since 24 February, when the escalation of the war began, the total volume of Russia’s petroleum products exports from the ports on the Black and Azov Seas (in contrast to the exports of crude oil) has hardly changed - it has remained at the level of 3 million tons per month. However, the structure of these exports has been changing radically since June-July 2022. From May to July 2022, the share of "EU+" countries in the imports of Russia’s petroleum products from the ports on the Black and Azov Seas decreased from 71.1% to 54.2%.
Exports of crude oil from Russia’s ports on the Black Sea in April-July 2022
12 August 2022
In July 2022, for the first time in 4 months, sea exports of Russia’s crude oil from the ports on the Black and Azov Seas decreased significantly compared to the previous month - by almost 1 million tons, or by 22.4%. So far, Russia has not been able to compensate for the reduction in crude oil exports to EU countries by increasing exports to other countries. No reorientation of Russia’s crude oil exports from the ports on the Black and Azov Seas to India and China, about which so much has been said in the media, has actually been observed. The export of “Kazakh-Russian” CPC oil is increasingly playing the role of a psychological irritant for the leadership of the Russian Federation.