Articles

The Monitoring Group of BlackSeaNews and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies presents an updated report on the state of the banking system of occupied Crimea. Today, only 5 operating banks of the Russian Federation remain on the peninsula. However, Russia's activity on the occupied territory requires the improvement of sanctions policy and monitoring tools.

The growth of industrial production in occupied Crimea was achieved due to the provision of Crimean enterprises with military orders. However, in the conditions of international sanctions and competition from the Russian military-industrial complex for state orders, in the coming years, the Crimean shipyards are unlikely to lay down new ships. They will be completing the vessels already laid down at the Zaliv Shipyard: first of all, the helicopter-carrying amphibious assault ships. Ship repair will become the main activity of other Crimean shipyards, which will lead to an increased workload of the plants in Sevastopol

As of November 2021, the following main conclusions can be made about the reverse restructuring of the Crimean economy: the programme of rearmament of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation with the newest missile ships, which had priority over other Russian fleets, is mostly coming to an end; the formation of a military-industrial base on the Crimean Peninsula to serve the needs of the occupying force of Russian troops is almost completed.

During 2014-2021, in violation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Russia has illegally extracted hydrocarbons in the waters of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea near occupied Crimea. There are two proceedings on these issues currently underway in international courts. The only thing that can be considered a notable "achievement" in the Russian development of the Ukrainian shelf is the creation of mini-military bases on the oil platforms. In 2021, due to international sanctions banning the export of equipment for offshore gas production to Russia, the gas output has decreased to the level of 2012.

As a result of the occupation and ensuing militarization of Crimea, tourism has ceased to be a priority industry of the Crimean economy in terms of budget and investment. Official estimates of the tourist flow to the peninsula are propagandistic and inflated by 2-3 times. The real size of the tourist flow to occupied Crimea is 2.5 million people, which is 1.6 times less than the estimated number of tourists before the occupation (4 million) and 3.2 times less than in Soviet times (8 million people)

According to Rosstat, during the years of the occupation, investment in fixed capital in Crimea and Sevastopol has totalled $11.0 billion and $2.2 billion respectively. Of this investment, $7.5 billion (68%) in Crimea and $1.6 billion (73%) in Sevastopol were funded from the state budget. Thus, the real nature of investment in the occupied territory indicates that under international sanctions Crimea by definition cannot become attractive for investors. It has been and will remain a financial burden for the budget of the occupying power.

From December 2018 to December 2020, due to the threat of the "Azov package" of international sanctions against Russian ports on the Sea of Azov, there was a slight decrease in the average duration of arbitrary delays of ships before leaving the Sea of Azov for the Black Sea:  in 2018 − 79.5 hours; in 2019 − up to 37.4 hours; in 2020 − 29.6 hours per vessel.  However, for 9 months of 2021, this figure has increased significantly  to 39.7 hours per vessel.

The Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, BlackSeaNews and Maidan of Foreign Affairs reports about closure of the various areas of the Black Sea in October, 2021.

Thus, as a result of the "trophy excitement," Crimean collaborators and their Moscow supervisors, who quickly arrived in the peninsula, found themselves needing to administer a vast amount of various property of the state of Ukraine, trade unions, research organizations, private enterprises, banks, etc. This created huge challenges related to administering these facilities, whose functioning or at least maintenance had to be ensured. The Monitoring Group of the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies and BlackSeaNews has confirmed, based on documentary sources, the facts of expropriation of 199 Crimean resort and recreation facilities

In September 2021, the average duration of artificial delays of vessels going from the Black Sea to the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, Mariupol and Berdiansk, by the RF was 22,4 hours. In September 2021, vessels carrying exports from Mariupol and Berdiansk were delayed at the exit from the Sea of Azov by the Russian Federation for an average of 39,7 hours

The Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, BlackSeaNews and Maidan of Foreign Affairs reports about closure of the various areas of the Black Sea in September, 2021.

In July 2021, the average duration of artificial delays of vessels going from the Black Sea to the Ukrainian ports on the Sea of Azov, Mariupol and Berdiansk, by the RF was 31,2 hours., in August 2021 – 15,3 hours. In July 2021, vessels carrying exports from Mariupol and Berdiansk were delayed at the exit from the Sea of Azov by the Russian Federation for an average of 28,0 hours, in February 2021 – 30,7 hours.

The Monitoring Group of the Institute of Black Sea Strategic Studies, BlackSeaNews and Maidan of Foreign Affairs reports about closure of the various areas of the Black Sea in August, 2021.

What has become increasingly important since 2018 is not only the developments on the occupied peninsula itself but also how Russia has been using Crimea, which has turned from a global problem into a military threat. It should be emphasized that no one can reliably predict what scenarios Russia will enact using the military capabilities created on the occupied peninsula. It is only possible to assert that the Russian Federation has not stopped and will not stop. We can also be certain that both blackmail by war and the actual "hot" war in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov against the coastal regions of Ukraine, as well as Georgia and Moldova, based on Crimea's military power, are completely realistic scenarios, which diplomats and the military should have on the table.

The article provides a selective legal analysis of some international agreements and existing formats of cooperation that have been used, are being used or may be used in the future by the Russian Federation (RF) in order to harm the national interest of Ukraine at sea.