Ways to Reduce Russia's Revenues from Seaborne Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Exports

The Monitoring Group of BlackSeaNews
and the Black Sea Institute of Strategic Studies

The authors of this report represent the team that has been monitoring maritime traffic for the last 15 years. Since April 2022, we have been monitoring the traffic of tankers carrying Russian crude oil and petroleum products on a daily basis.

Based on our experience, we argue that it's futile to counter "Russia's shadow fleet," as it's futile to counter anything that doesn't exist. What does exist instead is a fleet of tankers that transport Russian crude oil and petroleum products around the world.

Equally futile are the discussions on the "price cap" numbers, and for the same reason. 

The mechanism of the so-called price cap has never worked because it's impossible to ensure safeguards against falsification of the cargo value paperwork. Since 2022, in Russia, the signing of contracts in compliance with the price cap has been expressly prohibited by a presidential decree, which is strictly enforced.

Meanwhile, the ongoing usage of both notions in the media and expert circles serves as a de facto cover up of reality, namely that 30% of the tankers that transport crude oil from Russian ports are owned by companies registered in the EU (mainly, Greece) and that up to 10% of that oil is delivered to transshipment points off the EU countries’ costs in the Mediterranean Sea, from where, in violation of the embargo, it can then be delivered to EU states in small batches with fake paperwork.

So, the correct task is to fight for the reduction in Russian maritime exports of oil and petroleum products as the main external source of financing and therefore continuation of Russian aggression against the civilized world.

The concrete steps that can significantly diminish that source of funding for Russia's military capabilities are listed at the end of the report.

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Energy exports account for well over half of Russia's total export earnings. According to the Center for Global Studies “Strategy XXI” depending on global prices, in 2013-2021, when Russian statistics could still be used with caution, their share ranged from 54.3 to 68.8%.

It is important that the first place in the structure of revenues from Russian energy exports belongs not to natural gas, but rather, to crude oil and petroleum products: in 2021, they accounted for 71.13% of revenues from Russian energy exports, as opposed to only 21.92% from gas exports and 6.95% from coal exports.

Considering that after the outbreak of the full-scale war in 2022 Russian natural gas exports almost lost their main market in Europe, it can be safely assumed that the share of crude oil and petroleum products in the structure of Russia's energy exports now far exceeds 70%.

Consequently, revenues from crude oil and petroleum products exports are the largest external source of financing Russia's military spending, including the purchase of military equipment and dual-use goods abroad. Therefore, trends in Russian crude oil and petroleum products exports are one of the key crucial predictors of the duration of the war.

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While continuing its traditional monitoring of maritime exports of crude oil and petroleum products from Russian Black Sea ports that started in April 2022, since April 2024, the Monitoring Group has also been monitoring exports from Russian Baltic Sea ports. In addition, we monitor tankers in the Far East and the Northern Sea Route.

In our analysis, we purposely do not use any published monitoring data from foreign think tanks, since, as experience has shown, their methodology does not take into account the conditions of war, namely, the use of electronic warfare and/or physical interference with automated ship tracking systems, which leads to an up to 30% distortion of the data input into their software and respective publications.

Statistical Basis for Planning

All tables below are based on our own monitoring.

Table 1. The Volume of Russia’s Seaborne Crude Oil Exports in September 2024

Russia ports	Tanker DWT, tones	%
Baltic Sea	11 628 374	59,02
Far East	4 496 847	22,82
Black Sea	3 462 318	17,57
North	113 905	0,58
Total	19 701 444	100,00

Clearly, neither Ukraine nor its allies have any ability to influence the oil and petroleum products transportation in the North and the Far East. 

But that's relatively insignificant, since exports from the Black and Baltic Seas account for approximately 80% of Russia's total maritime oil and petroleum products exports (see Table 4).

With that, at almost 60% of the crude oil exports, undoubtedly, it's the Baltic Sea that is the most important one for strategic planning, both in terms of the volume of exports and favourable political and geographical conditions.

Table 2. The Number of Tankers Involved in Russian Oil Exports from Baltic and Black Sea Ports, Excluding LNG

Number of tankers	04/2024	05/2024	06/2024	07/2024	08/2024	09/2024
Russian crude oil, tankers
- Baltic Sea	104	100	94	92	89	99
- Black Sea	34	29	32	27	33	29
Total	138	129	126	119	122	128
Russian petroleum products, tankers
- Baltic Sea	70	56	69	60	54	55
- Black Sea	142	141	140	132	137	124
Total	212	197	209	192	191	179
Total fleet number	350	326	335	311	313	307

 

All the tankers are listed on our regularly updated database Russian Blood-Soaked Oil. *)

* Each ship is listed with: Name / IMO / DWT / Flag / Year built / Port of departure / Actual time of departure / Port of destination / Estimated or actual time of arrival/ Registered owner / Ship manager/Commercial manager.

On average, 310-350 tankers operate from Baltic and Black Sea ports monthly, 120-140 of which carry crude oil and 190-210 ones – petroleum products.

Taking into account the repeated (cyclic) voyages, we can roughly estimate the total number of tankers that have transported Russian crude oil and petroleum products from its Baltic and Black Sea ports over the past 6 months at 900-1,000 vessels, of which approximately 300-400 are crude oil tankers. (If needed, an accurate list that excludes repeated voyages can be promptly put together from the monthly data).

Table 3. The Volume of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Exports from Russia's Baltic and Black Sea Ports in April-September 2024, Excluding LNG

Month, tons	04/2024	05/2024	06/2024	07/2024	08/2024	09/2024
Russian crude oil
Baltic Sea	11 806 110	11 313 931	10 677 104	10 448 481	10 328 818	11 628 374
Black Sea	4 066 358	3 498 137	4 135 544	3 385 130	4 203 250	3 462 318
Black Sea/ Baltic Sea ratio	34,4: 65,6%	30,9 : 69,1%	38,7 : 61,3%	32,4 : 67,6%	28,9 : 71,1%	22,9 : 77,1%
Total crude oil	15 872 468	14 812 068	14 812 648	13 833 611	14 532 068	15 090 692
Russian petroleum products
Baltic Sea	3 731 761	2 467 673	3 306 525	2 862 773	2 639 950	2 707 343
Black Sea	3 612 444	3 615 522	3 560 657	3 643 826	3 557 900	3 758 475
Total petroleum products	7 344 205	6 083 195	6 867 182	6 506 599	6 197 850	6 465 818
Total crude oil and petroleum products	23 216 673	20 895 263	21 679 830	20 340 210	19 790 042	21 556 510

The monthly export volume of crude oil from Russia’s Baltic and Black Sea ports totals 14-16 million tons. The ratio of crude oil exports from Black Sea ports to those from Baltic Sea ports is approximately 1:3.

The monthly export volume of petroleum products from Russia’s Baltic and Black Sea ports totals 6-7 million tons. The ratio of oil product exports from Black Sea ports to those from Baltic Sea ports is approximately 1:1.

Table 4. Russia’s Crude Oil Carriers from Baltic Sea Ports in May and September 2024, by Country of Registration of the Registered Owner/ Ship Manager/ Commercial Manager

Country of shipowner's registration	DWT, May 2024	%	DWT, September 2024	%
Greece	3 456 555	30,6	3 556 233	30,6
UAE-Russia	1 880 378	16,6	1 887 578	16,2
China	1 255 920	11,1	1 471 507	12,7
FOC countries	1 314 366	11,6	1 120 966	9,6
Turkey	611 771	5,4	1 072 714	9,2
India	819 630	7,2	873 937	7,5
Azerbaijan	326 211	2,9	643 342	5,5
Moldova	536 535	4,7	317 122	2,7
Singapore	113 226	1,0	198 544	1,7
Kuwait	112 147	1,0	156 682	1,3
Pakistan	-	-	115 605	1,0
Vietnam	654 290	5,8	108 870	0,9
Cyprus			105 274	0,9
Kazakhstan	232 902	2,1	-	-
Total	11 313 931	100,0	11 628 374	100,0

 

Over the six months, the distribution of Russia’s crude oil transportation market from Baltic Sea ports has hardly changed. 

Tankers owned by Greek shipowners account for more than 30% of the transportation.

Together with tankers registered in Cyprus and Moldova, an EU candidate country, 34.2% of the tanker transportation market belongs to companies from EU+ countries.

The share of tankers registered in “flag of convenience” (FOC) countries, i.e. where the real owners of tankers may be hidden, is only 10-12%.

Table 5. Technical Condition and Age of Tankers Carrying Russian Crude Oil from Baltic Ports in September 2024

Country of shipowner's registration	Number of tankers in September 2024	Average tanker age, years
Moldova	3	21,7
Pakistan	1	21
Cyprus	1	20
FOC	9	19,7
Singapore	2	19
Turkey	10	18,6
India	8	18
Azerbaijan	6	16,8
China	11	16,5
Vietnam	1	14
UAE-Russia	17	13,7
Greece	29	12,6
Kuwait	1	6

 

The idea about the critical age of the tanker fleet and its respective poor technical condition, which is widely spread in the media, is false. Statements that tankers over 15 years of age are too old and in poor technical condition are unprofessional, since shipping practice demonstrates that even much older vessels can be in a very good shape. The average age of the 99 tankers that transported Russian crude oil from Baltic Sea ports in September 2024 is 15.7 years, which is not critical.

The main criterion for a tanker's technical condition is not the age, but rather, its presence or absence on the “white," “black,” or “grey” lists of international memoranda of understanding on port state control, such as Tokyo MOU and Paris MOU.

Of the 99 tankers transporting Russian crude oil from its Baltic Sea ports in September 2024, only 28 ones, or 28.3%, were blacklisted in the memoranda, i.e. had serious technical problems. And only 37 ones, or 37.4%, were on the “grey lists,” i.e. had fixable technical problems.

The largest number of the blacklisted tankers carrying Russian crude oil from Baltic Sea ports belong to FOC countries (8 out of 9), Azerbaijan (6 out of 6), and India (4 out of 8).

Of the 17 tankers owned by Russian (UAE) owners, only 3 are blacklisted, while the largest (29) fleet of the tankers-carriers that belongs to Greece has no technical problems at all.

In September 2024, 99 tankers transported Russian crude oil. 45 of them, i.e. 45.5% or almost half, had full P&I insurance coverage. The rest were insured by companies from India, China, etc.

Thus, the information spread in the media about the “vast majority of uninsured tankers” is exaggerated.

Where Russian Crude Oil and Petroleum Products
Were Transported from Baltic and Black Sea Ports
in April-September 2024

Table 6. Insurance of Russian Crude Oil Carriers from Baltic Sea Ports in September 2024

Month, tons	04/2024	05/2024	06/2024	07/2024	08/2024	09/2024
Russia’s total crude oil exports from Baltic Sea ports, tons	11 806 110	11 313 931	10 677 104	10 448 481	10 328 818	11 628 374
Russia’s crude oil from Baltic Sea ports to EU ports and STS, tons	828 519	655 615	496 689	431 524	377 194	560 383
Russia’s crude oil from Baltic Sea ports to non-EU ports, tons	10 977 591	10 658 316	10 180 415	10 016 957	9 951 624	11 067 991
Russia’s total exports of petroleum products from Baltic Sea ports, tons	3 731 761	2 467 673	3 306 525	2 862 773	2 639 950	2 707 343
Russia’s petroleum products from Baltic Sea ports to EU ports and STS, tons	877 976	396 243	431 203	168 974	227 072	517 858
Russia’s petroleum products from Baltic Sea ports to non-EU ports, tons	2 853 785	2 071 430	2 875 322	2 693 799	2 412 878	2 189 485
Russia’s total crude oil exports from Black Sea ports, tons	4 066 358	3 498 137	4 135 544	3 385 130	4 203 250	3 462 318
Russia’s crude oil from Black Sea ports to EU ports and STS, tons	199 352	157 327	275 850	580 047	897 066	636 059
Russia’s crude oil from Black Sea ports to non-EU ports, tons	3 867 006	3 340 810	3 859 694	2 805 083	3 306 184	2 826 259
Russia’s total exports of petroleum products from Black Sea ports, tons	3 612 444	3 615 522	3 560 657	3 643 826	3 557 900	3 758 475
Russia’s petroleum products from Black Sea ports to EU ports and STS, tons	869 882	549 518	454 546	637 442	578 701	823 089
Russia’s petroleum products from Black Sea ports to non-EU ports, tons	2 742 562	3 066 004	3 106 111	3 006 384	2 979 199	2 935 386

Our monitoring statistics leave no doubt that a significant amount of Russian crude oil and petroleum products from Baltic and Black Sea ports gets to transshipment points off EU countries' coasts and sometimes even directly to EU ports in direct violation of the embargo.

Over just 6 months from April to September 2024, about 6.2 million tons of crude oil (7.1% of the total volume) and 6.5 million tons of petroleum products (16.6% of the total volume) were delivered both to transshipment points and directly to EU ports.

Table 7. Where Russian Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Were Transported from Baltic and Black Sea Ports in April-September 2024

Month, tons	04/2024	05/2024	06/2024	07/2024	08/2024	09/2024	За 6 міс
Russia’s total crude oil exports from Black Sea and Baltic Sea ports, tons	15 872 468	14 812 068	14 812 648	13 833 611	14 532 068	15 090 692	88 953 555
Russia’s crude oil from Black Sea and Baltic Sea ports to EU ports and STS, tons	1 027 871	812 942	772 539	1 011 571	1 475 767	1 196 442	6 297 132 (7,1%)
Russia’s total exports of petroleum products from Black Sea an Baltic Sea ports, tons	7 344 205	6 083 195	6 867 182	6 506 599	6 197 850	6 465 818	39 464 849
Russia’s petroleum products from Black Sea and Baltic Sea ports to EU ports and STS, tons	1 747 858	945 761	885 749	806 416	805 773	1 340 947	6 532 504 (16,6%)

 

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Practical Steps Towards Reducing the Volume of Maritime Transportation of Russian Crude Oil and Petroleum Products

1. The EU or the coalition of EU/NATO coastal states of the Baltic and Black Seas should declare a "special period" for the application and/or temporary suspension of certain rules of the law of the sea and international agreements relating to freedom of navigation, freedom of passage and transit until the end of Russian aggression.
Since the law of the sea, particularly the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, is de facto a peacetime law, it is impossible to change the status quo within its framework. Therefore, the measures to be developed should be based on the principles of a special period, during which partner and allied countries could officially introduce steps and measures that may not fully comply with the rules of the peacetime law of the sea.

2. The EU should strictly prohibit all EU shipowners from transporting any Russian oil and petroleum products from Russian ports.
That would quickly reduce the transportation volume by 30% and create a shortage of tanker fleet for Russia for some period of time.

3. The EU should toughen and make unambiguous the wording of the sanctions regime regarding a categorical ban for all EU ports on accepting tankers with oil and petroleum products taken on board at transshipment areas.
That would quickly reduce the volume of Russian oil and petroleum products entering the EU in violation of the embargo by up to 10%.
The transshipment areas are located:
2 – off the northern coast of Morocco in the Mediterranean Sea,
1 – south of the Laconian Gulf near the island of Kýthira (Greece) – the EU,
1 – south of the island of Chios (Greece) – the EU,
1 – south of the island of Lesbos (Greece) – the EU,
1 – off the coast of Malta – the EU,
1 – at the entrance to the Suez Strait,
1 – near the Israeli port of Haifa.

4. The EU or the coalition of EU/NATO coastal states of the Baltic Sea should quickly put on sanctions lists ALL tankers that over the past 6 months have been identified as transporting Russian crude oil and petroleum products.
The sanctions should prohibit their use of not only the territorial sea, ports, and berths but also pilotage and other maritime services within the EU.
Even the launch of this process would have a huge impact on tanker owners.

5. The EU or at least the coalition of EU/NATO coastal states of the Baltic Sea should temporarily introduce mandatory pilotage in the Danish Straits connecting the Baltic and North Seas.
Prohibiting the use of pilotage and other maritime services for sanctioned vessels will effectively block the only way from Russian Baltic ports for tankers carrying “blood-soaked oil.”

6. Simultaneously with the development of these proposals, all interested parties need to promptly facilitate expert discussion on the possible impact of these measures on world oil prices, as well as ways to compensate for Russia's countermeasures aimed at pushing the global prices upward.

To be continued...

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The publication has been created with the support of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation(FES). The position of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the authors.